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Abstract
We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of exponentially discounted utility
(EDU) over consumption streams. Given is an individual agent’s behavior in the market:
assume a finite collection of purchases across periods. We show that such behavior
satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a EDU model (a discount
rate per period and a concave utility function over money) that accounts for the given
intertemporal consumption.
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1 Introduction
Many areas of economics involve intertemporal decision making. For example, many
ideas in macroeconomics, finance and dynamic game theory often hinge on certain in-
tertemporal tradeoffs. The model of exponentially discounted utility (EDU) is by far
the most common assumption placed on individual agents in all these areas. The EDU
model is an essential tool in the study of intertemporal decisions, at least since Samuelson
(1937).
In macro or finance, EDU is used as a way of generating individual’s behavior in
response to market conditions: prices and wealth. Given prices (or interest rates) and
wealth, individuals maximize discounted utility. The underlying justification is that
individuals’ behavior is as if they were maximizing an EDU. It is therefore important
to understand the behaviors that can be rationalized as if they arose from individuals
maximizing discounted utility.
There are different behavioral axiomatizations of EDU in the literature, starting with
Koopmans (1960), and followed by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982), Fishburn and Ed-
wards (1997), and Bleichrodt et al. (2008). All of them take preferences as primitive,
or in some cases they take utility over consumption streams as the primitive. The idea
is that an analyst can observe all pairwise comparisons of consumption streams, or that
the relevant behavior consists of all pairwise comparisons of consumption streams. Note
that this assumes knowledge of an infinite number of pairwise comparisons: so the given
“dataset” is infinite.
∗We thank Kim Border and Chris Chambers for inspiration and advice.
For macroeconomics and finance, however, it is possible that the most relevant be-
havior is different. Theories in macro and finance use EDU to model market behavior.
They predict what agents choose given prices and wealth, which is less demanding than
predicting all pairwise comparisons of consumption streams. The purpose of our paper
is to characterize the set of market behaviors that is consistent with the EDU model.
Given that EDU is so often assumed as a model of behavior in the market, it seems
very important to understand the nature of EDU behavior. What is the class of behaviors,
in a macro or finance market setting, that are consistent with EDU? We show that
intertemporal consumption (a finite consumption stream) and prices satisfy one revealed
preference axiom if and only if there exists a EDU model (i.e., a discount rate and a
concave utility function over money) that accounts for intertemporal consumption given
the prices. In addition, we assume given a finite number of observed choices, so our
datasets will be finite.
This note is a companion paper to our recent paper Echenique and Saito (2013), in
which we develop a similar result for subjective expected utility. The argument used to
prove our results is very similar in both papers, and the form of the axiom required to
characterize EDU is very similar to the one that characterized subjective expected utility.
We proceed to discuss the aforementioned papers that axiomatize the EDU model.
All of them use either preferences over consumption streams or a utility function over
consumption streams as their primitive. Another important difference with our setup is
that they assume infinitely many periods. In contrast, we suppose that we observe finite
consumption streams.
Koopmans (1960) proposes the well-known stationarity axiom, which says a prefer-
ence is not affected if a common first consumption is dropped and the timing of all other
consumptions is advanced by one period. The stationarity axiom is used by many follow-
ers and the axiom is used together with the assumption that the set of periods is infinite.
In Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) preferences are defined on one-time consumptions in
continuous time. In Fishburn and Edwards (1997), preferences are defined on infinite
consumption streams that differ in at most finitely many periods. More recently, Ble-
ichrodt et al. (2008) show that Koopmans (1960)’s axioms imply the boundedness of
utility function. Then, Bleichrodt et al. (2008) axiomatize the EDU model possibly with
unbounded utility function by using preferences defined on infinite consumption streams.
There are several axiomatizations of quasi-hyperbolic disuniting utility model, which
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is more general than EDU. See Attema et al. (2010) and Olea and Strzalecki (2013) for
example. All of them use preferences as their primitives and require the set of periods is
infinite.
2 Model and Results
We use the following notational conventions: For vectors x, y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y means that
xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, . . . , n; x < y means that x ≤ y and x 6= y; and x  y means that
xi < yi for all i = 1, . . . , n. The inner product of two vectors is x · y =
∑n
i=1 xiyi.
2.1 Model
The model to be tested is that of exponentially discounted utility. Suppose T time
periods, and index time by t = 1, . . . , T . A consumption stream is a vector in RT+.
Consider a decision-maker, a consumer, that chooses a consumption stream x ∈ RT+.
The consumer’s choice solves the following problem:
maxx∈RT+
T∑
t=1
βt−1u(xt)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
ptxt ≤ I,
(1)
in which p ∈ RT++ is a vector of prices, these can be thought of as interest rates; I is the
agent’s (present-value) wealth; β ∈ (0, 1] is the agent’s discount factor, and u : R+ → R
is her utility function. We suppose that u is strictly increasing and concave.
One cannot observe u or β; one can only observe the consumer’s behavior.
2.2 Data
We are given a collection of decisions made by our consumer. We observe the choices of
a consumption plan made at various prices and income levels.
Definition 1. A dataset is a collection (xk, pk)Kk=1, where x
k, pk ∈ RT++ for all k and
xkt 6= xk′t′ if (k, t) 6= (k′, t′).
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The interpretation of a dataset is as follows. There are K observations, indexed by
k = 1, . . . , K. Each observation consists of a consumption stream xk purchased at some
vector of strictly positive prices pk across periods. Given the assumption that utility is
monotone increasing, we take the level of income at observation k to be pk ·xk (a standard
procedure in all studies on revealed preference using consumption data).
A data set can be thought of in two different ways. One the one hand, it could be
the plan made by a consumer for consumption over time. On the other hand, it can be
his actual choice made in each period. Both interpretations are equivalent because of
the dynamic consistency implied by the EDU model. For other models, such as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, the distinction between these two kinds of data can be very
important.
The assumption that xkt 6= xk′t′ if (k, t) 6= (k′, t′) is for simplicity of the analysis. The
essence of our results is true without the assumption: see Section 3.1.
The datasets that are consistent with the theory of exponential discounted utility are
those that can be explained by some specification of the unobservable components of the
model. Formally,
Definition 2. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is exponential discounted utility rational (EDU
rational) if there is a number β ∈ (0, 1] and a concave and strictly increasing function
u : R+ → R such that, for all k,
pk · y ≤ pk · xk ⇒
∑
t∈T
βt−1u(yt) ≤
∑
t∈T
βt−1u(xkt ).
2.3 Theorem
Consider the maximization problem (1). Suppose that the function u is continuously
differentiable (an assumption that turns out to be without loss of generality). The first-
order condition for an interior solution is
βt−1u′(xt) = λkpt,
where λk is a Lagrange multiplier. So if a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational, the discount
factor β and utility u must satisfy the above first order condition for each xkt and p
k
t .
Suppose that one tries to derive the implications on quantities x of some property of
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the observed prices. From the first-order conditions, one can obtain that
u′(xk
′
t′ )
u′(xkt )
=
βt
βt′
λk
′
pk
′
t′
λkpkt
.
Suppose that xkt > x
k′
t′ . The concavity of u and x
k
t > x
k′
t′ implies that
βt
βt′
λk
′
pk
′
t′
λkpkt
≤ 1,
but the discount rate β and the Lagrange multipliers λk
′
and λk are unobservable so we
cannot conclude anything about the observable
pk
′
t′
pkt
.
There is, however, one implication of EDU and the concavity of u that can unambigu-
ously be obtained, despite the role of unobservables. We can consider a sequence of pairs
(xkt , x
k′
t′ ) chosen such that when we divide first-order conditions as above, all Lagrange
multipliers cancel out, and the effect of the discount factors is predicted (even though we
do not know the value of the discount factor). For example, consider
xk1t1 > x
k2
t2 and x
k2
t3 > x
k1
t4 .
such that
t1 + t3 ≥ t2 + t4.
By manipulating first-order conditions we obtain that:
u′(xk1t1 )
u′(xk2t2 )
· u
′(xk2t3 )
u′(xk1t4 )
=
(
βt2−1
βt1−1
λk1pk1t1
λk2pk2t2
)
·
(
βt4−1
βt3−1
λk2pk2t3
λk1pk1t4
)
= β(t2+t4)−(t1+t3)
pk1t1
pk2t2
pk2t3
pk1t4
Notice that the pairs (xk1t1 , x
k2
t2 ) and (x
k2
t3 , x
k1
t4 ) have been chosen so that the Lagrange
multipliers would cancel out and the discount factors unambiguously increase the value
on the left hand side (i.e., β(t2+t4)−(t1+t3) ≥ 1 for any β ∈ (0, 1]).
Now the concavity of u and the assumption that xk1t1 > x
k2
t2 and x
k2
t3 > x
k1
s4
imply
that the product β(t2+t4)−(t1+t3)
p
k1
t1
p
k2
t2
p
k2
t3
p
k1
t4
cannot exceed 1. Since β(t2+t4)−(t1+t3) ≥ 1 for any
β ∈ (0, 1], then p
k1
t1
p
k2
t2
p
k2
t3
p
k1
t4
cannot exceed 1. Thus, we obtain an implication of EDU for
prices, an observable entity. No matter what the values of the unobservable β and u, we
find that the ratio of prices cannot be more than 1.
In general, the assumption of EDU rationality will require that, for any collection of
sequences as above (appropriately chosen so that Lagrange multipliers will cancel out
and the discount factors unambiguously increase the product of the ratio of prices) the
product of the ratio of prices cannot exceed 1. Formally,
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Axiom 1. For any sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
)ni=1 in which
1. xkiti ≥ x
k′i
t′i
for all i;
2.
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i;
3. each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears
as k′i (on the right):
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′i
t′i
≤ 1.
Our result is that this necessary condition turns out be sufficient as well.
Theorem 1. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational if and only if it satisfies Axiom 1.
Note that Axiom 1 is different from our axiom in Echenique and Saito (2013) only in
the second requirement for the sequence.
3 Extension
In this section, we extend the results into possibly constant consumption streams and
risky consumption streams.
3.1 Constant Consumption Stream
We have assumed that xkt 6= xk′t′ if (k, t) 6= (k′, t′). We now relax this assumption. In this
section, a dataset is a collection (xk, pk)Kk=1 where for all k x
k, pk ∈ RT++.
When we allow for xkt 6= xk′t′ , then there is a gap in our result: Axiom 1 is still sufficient
for strict EDU rationality, but only necessary for EDU rationality with a differentiable
utility function. A concave utility function is almost everywhere differentiable, so the
gap is “small.”
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Definition 3. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is smooth EDU rational if there is a number β ∈
(0, 1] and a differentiable, concave and strictly increasing function u : R+ → R such that,
for all k,
pk · y ≤ pk · xk ⇒
∑
t∈T
βt−1u(yt) ≤
∑
t∈T
βt−1u(xkt ).
Theorem 2. If a dataset satisfies Axiom 1 then it is EDU rational. If a dataset is
smooth EDU rational, then it satisfies Axiom 1.
3.2 Risky Consumption Stream
In many economic applications, decision maker’s consumptions often involve uncertainty.
In this section, we extend the results to risky consumption streams.
The model to be tested is that of exponentially discounted utility with subjective ex-
pected utility. We introduce a new primitive, a finite set S of states. A risky consumption
stream is a vector in RT×S++ .
Consider a decision-maker, a consumer, that chooses a risky consumption stream
x ∈ RT×S++ . The consumer’s choice solves the following problem:
maxx∈RT×S++
∑
t∈T
βt−1
∑
s∈S
µsu(x(t,s))
s.t.
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
p(t,s)x(t,s) ≤ I.
(2)
Note that (2) is differ from (1) in that the decision maker faces an uncertainty over a
realization of a state; and he has a subjective probability over the set of states. Note also
that Theorem 1 characterizes (2) with S = {1}; Echenique and Saito (2013) (Theorem
1) characterize (2) with T = {1}.
In this section, we observe the choices of a consumption plan across states made at
various prices and income levels.
Definition 4. A dataset is a collection (xk, pk)Kk=1, where x
k ∈ RS++ and pk ∈ RT++ for
all k and xk(t,s) 6= xk
′
(t′,s′) if (k, t, s) 6= (k′, t′, s′).
The interpretation of a dataset is as follows. There are K observations, indexed by
k = 1, . . . , K. In each observation k, for each period t, the data consists of a consumption
xkt ∈ RS++ across states, purchased at strictly positive prices pkt ∈ RS++ across states.
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The assumption that xk(t,s) 6= xk
′
(t′,s′) if (k, t, s) 6= (k′, t′, s′) is for simplicity of the
analysis. The essence of our results is true without the assumption as in Section 3.1.
Definition 5. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is exponential discounting-subjective expected utility
rational (ED-SEU rational) if there is a number β ∈ (0, 1], a vector µ ∈ RS++ such that∑S
s=1 µs = 1 and a concave and strictly increasing function u : R+ → R such that, for
all k,
pk · y ≤ pk · xk ⇒
∑
t∈T
βt−1
∑
s∈S
µsu(y(t,s)) ≤
∑
t∈T
βt−1
∑
s∈S
µsu(x
k
(t,s)).
The ED-SEU rationality can be characterized by the following axiom:
Axiom 2. For any sequence of pairs (xki(ti,si), x
k′i
(t′i,s
′
i)
)ni=1 in which
1. xki(ti,si) ≥ x
k′i
(t′i,s
′
i)
for all i;
2.
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i;
3. each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears
as k′i (on the right);
4. each s appears as si (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears
as s′i (on the right):
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pki(ti,si)
p
k′i
(t′i,s
′
i)
≤ 1.
Theorem 3. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is ED-SEU rational if and only if it satisfies Axiom 2.
Note that the four requirements in Axiom 2 are the combination of those in Axiom 1
and in Axiom 1 of Echenique and Saito (2013). The Proof of Theorem 3 is omitted; it is
similar to the proof of 1 and the proof of Theorem 1 in Echenique and Saito (2013).
4 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is based on using the first-order conditions for maximizing a utility with the
EDU model over a budget set. Our first lemma ensures that we can without loss of
generality restrict attention to first order conditions. The proof of the lemma is the
same as that of Lemma 3 in Echenique and Saito (2013) with the changes of T to S and
{βt−1}t∈T to {µs}s∈S.
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Lemma 1. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. The following statements are equivalent:
1. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational.
2. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational with a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing
and concave utility function.
3. There are strictly positive numbers vkt , λ
k, and β ∈ (0, 1), for t = 1, . . . , T and
k = 1, . . . , K, such that
βt−1vkt = λ
kpkt
xkt > x
k′
t′ ⇒ vkt ≤ vk
′
t′ .
We shall use the following lemma, which is a version of the Theorem of the Alternative.
This is Theorem 1.6.1 in Stoer and Witzgall (1970). We shall use it here in the cases
where F is either the real or the rational numbers.
Lemma 2. Let A be an m× n matrix, B be an l× n matrix, and E be an r× n matrix.
Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E belong the a commutative ordered
field F. Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.
1. There is u ∈ Fn such that A · u = 0, B · u ≥ 0, E · u 0.
2. There is θ ∈ Fr, η ∈ Fl, and pi ∈ Fm such that θ ·A+ η ·B + pi ·E = 0; pi > 0 and
η ≥ 0.
We also use the following lemma, which follows from Lemma 2 (See Border (2013) or
Chambers and Echenique (2011)):
Lemma 3. Let A be an m× n matrix, B be an l× n matrix, and E be an r× n matrix.
Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E are rational numbers. Exactly one
of the following alternatives is true.
1. There is u ∈ Rn such that A · u = 0, B · u ≥ 0, and E · u 0.
2. There is θ ∈ Qr, η ∈ Ql, and pi ∈ Qm such that θ · A + η · B + pi · E = 0; pi > 0
and η ≥ 0.
We use the following notation in the proofs:
X = {xkt : k = 1, . . . , K, t = 1, . . . , T}.
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4.1 Necessity
Lemma 4. If a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational, then it satisfies Axiom 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1, if a dataset is EDU rational then there is a continuously differ-
entiable and concave rationalization u and a strictly positive solution vkt , λ
k, β to the
system in Statement (3) of Lemma 1 with u′(xkt ) = v
k
t . Let (x
ki
ti , x
k′i
t′i
)ni=1 be a sequence
satisfying the three conditions in Axiom 1. Then xkiti > x
k′i
t′i
, so
1 ≥ u
′(xkiti )
u′(xk
′
i
t′i
)
=
λkiβt
′
i−1pkiti
λk
′
iβti−1pk
′
i
t′i
.
Thus,
1 ≥
n∏
i=1
u′(xkiti )
u′(xk
′
i
t′i
)
=
n∏
i=1
λkiβt
′
i−1pkiti
λk
′
iβti−1pk
′
i
t′i
= β
∑n
i=1 t
′
i−
∑n
i=1 ti
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′i
t′i
.
The numbers λk appear the same number of times in the denominator as in the numerator
of this product, as the sequence satisfies (3) in Axiom 1. Then we obtain that
β
∑n
i=1 ti−
∑n
i=1 t
′
i ≥
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′i
t′i
.
Since β ≤ 1 and ∑ni=1 ti ≥∑ni=1 t′i, and the sequence satisfies (3) in Axiom 1, we obtain
that 1 ≥∏ni=1 pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
.
4.2 Sufficiency
We proceed to prove the sufficiency direction. Sufficiency follows from the following
lemmas as in Echenique and Saito (2013).
We know from Lemma 1 that it suffices to find a solution to the first order conditions.
Lemma 5 establishes that Axiom 1 is sufficient when the logarithms of the prices are
rational numbers. The role of rational logarithms comes from our use of a version of
Farkas’s Lemma. Lemma 6 says that we can approximate any data satisfying Axiom 1
with a dataset for which the logs of prices are rational and for which Axiom 1 is satisfied.
Finally, Lemma 7 establishes the result. It is worth mentioning that we cannot use
Lemma 6 and an approximate solution to obtain a limiting solution.
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Lemma 5. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1. Suppose that log(p
k
t ) ∈ Q for all k and
t. Then there are numbers vkt , λ
k, β, for t = 1, . . . , T and k = 1, . . . , K satisfying (3) in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1. Then for all positive numbers ε, there
exists qkt ∈ [pkt − ε, pkt ] for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K such that log qkt ∈ Q and the dataset
(xk, qk)kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1.
Lemma 7. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1. Then there are numbers v
k
t , λ
k, β, for
t = 1, . . . , T and k = 1, . . . , K satisfying (3) in Lemma 1.
4.3 Proof of Lemma 5
We linearize the equation in System (3) of Lemma 1. The result is:
log v(xkt ) + t log β − log λk − log pkt = 0, (3)
x > x′ ⇒ log v(x′) ≥ log v(x) (4)
log(β) ≤ 0. (5)
In the system comprised by (3) (4) and 5, the unknowns are the real numbers log vkt ,
log β, k = 1, . . . , K and t = 1, . . . , T .
First, we are going to write the system of inequalities (3) and (4) in matrix form.
A system of linear inequalities
We shall define a matrix A such that there are positive numbers vkt , λ
k, β the logs
of which satisfy Equation (3) if and only if there is a solution u ∈ RK×T+1+K+1 to the
system of equations
A · u = 0,
and for which the last component of u is strictly positive.
Let A be a matrix with K×T rows and K×T +1+K+1 columns, defined as follows:
We have one row for every pair (k, t); one column for every pair (k, t); one column for
each k; and two additional columns. Organize the columns so that we first have the K×T
columns for the pairs (k, t); then one of the single columns mentioned in last place, which
we shall refer to as the β-column; then K columns (one for each k); and finally one last
column. In the row corresponding to (k, t) the matrix has zeroes everywhere with the
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following exceptions: it has a 1 in the column for (k, t); it has a t in the β column; it has
a −1 in the column for k; and − log pkt in the very last column.
Thus, matrix A looks as follows:

(1,1) ··· (k,t) ··· (K,T ) 1 ··· k ··· K p
(1,1) 1 · · · 0 · · · 0 1 −1 · · · 0 · · · 0 − log p11
...
...
...
...
...
...
... 0
...
(k,t) 0 · · · 1 · · · 0 t 0 · · · −1 · · · 0 − log pkt
...
...
...
...
...
...
... 0
...
(K,T ) 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 T 0 · · · 0 · · · −1 − log pKT

Consider the system A · u = 0. If there are numbers solving Equation (3), then these
define a solution u ∈ RK×T+1+K+1 for which the last component is 1. If, on the other
hand, there is a solution u ∈ RK×T+1+K+1 to the system A · u = 0 in which the last
component is strictly positive, then by dividing through by the last component of u we
obtain numbers that solve Equation (3).
In second place, we write the system of inequalities (4) in matrix form. Let B be
a matrix B with (|X |(|X | − 1)/2) + 1 rows and K × T + 1 + K + 1 columns. Define
B as follows: One row for every pair x, x′ ∈ X with x > x′; in the row corresponding
to x, x′ ∈ X with x > x′ we have zeroes everywhere with the exception of a −1 in the
column for (k, t) such that x = xkt and a 1 in the column for (k
′, t′) such that x′ = xk
′
t′ .
These define |X |(|X |− 1)/2 rows. Finally, in the last row, we have zero everywhere with
the exception of a −1 at K × T + 1th column. We shall refer to this last row as the
β-row.
In third place, we have a matrix E that captures the requirement that the last compo-
nent of a solution be strictly positive. The matrix E has a single row and K×T+1+K+1
columns. It has zeroes everywhere except for 1 in the last column.
To sum up, there is a solution to system (3), (4) and (5) if and only if there is a vector
u ∈ RK×T+1+K+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S1 :

A · u = 0,
B · u ≥ 0,
E · u 0.
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Theorem of the Alternative
The entries of A, B, and E are integer numbers, with the exception of the last column
of A. Under the hypothesis of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of
rational numbers.
By Lemma 3, then, there is such a solution u to S1 if and only if there is no vector
(θ, η, pi) ∈ QK×T+(|X |(|X |−1)/2)+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S2 :

θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0,
η ≥ 0,
pi > 0.
In the following, we shall prove that the non-existence of a solution u implies that
the data must violate Axiom 1. Suppose then that there is no solution u and let (θ, η, pi)
be a rational vector as above, solving system S2.
By multiplying (θ, η, pi) by any positive integer we obtain new vectors that solve S2,
so we can take (θ, η, pi) to be integer vectors.
Henceforth, we use the following notational convention: For a matrix D with K ×
T + 1 + K + 1 columns, write D1 for the submatrix of D corresponding to the first
K×T columns; let D2 be the submatrix corresponding to the following one column (i.e.,
β-column); D3 correspond to the next K columns; and D4 to the last column. Thus,
D = [D1 D2 D3 D4 ].
Claim 1. (i) θ · A1 + η · B1 = 0; (ii) θ · A2 + η · B2 = 0; (iii) θ · A3 = 0; and (iv)
θ · A4 + pi · E4 = 0.
Proof. Since θ ·A+ η ·B + pi ·E = 0, then θ ·Ai + η ·Bi + pi ·Ei = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 4.
Moreover, since B3, B4, E1, E2, and E3 are zero matrices, we obtain the claim. 
For convenience, we transform the matrices A and B using θ and η.
Transform the matrices A and B
Lets define a matrix A∗ from A by letting A∗ have the same number of columns as A
and including
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1. θr copies of the rth row when θr > 0;
2. omitting row r when θr = 0;
3. and θr copies of the rth row multiplied by −1 when θr < 0.
We refer to rows that are copies of some r with θr > 0 as original rows, and to those
that are copies of some r with θr < 0 as converted rows.
Similarly, we define the matrix B∗ from B by including the same columns as B and
ηr copies of each row (and thus omitting row r when ηr = 0; recall that ηr ≥ 0 for all r).
Claim 2. For any (k, t), all the entries in the column for (k, t) in A∗1 are of the same
sign.
Proof. By definition of A, the column for (k, t) will have zero in all its entries with the
exception of the row for (k, t). In A∗, for each (k, t), there are three mutually exclusive
possibilities: the row for (k, t) in A can (i) not appear in A∗, (ii) it can appear as original,
or (iii) it can appear as converted. This shows the claim.
Claim 3. There exists a sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
)n
∗
i=1 that satisfies (1) in Axiom 1.
Proof. We define such a sequence by induction. Let B1 = B∗. Given Bi, define Bi+1 as
follows.
Denote by >i the binary relation on X defined by z >i z′ if z > z′ and there is at
least one copy of the row corresponding to z > z′ in Bi. The binary relation >i cannot
exhibit cycles because >i⊆>. There is therefore at least one sequence zi1, . . . ziLi in X
such that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1, . . . , Li−1 and with the property that there is no z ∈ X
with z >i zi1 or z
i
Li
>i z.
Let the matrix Bi+1 be defined as the matrix obtained from Bi by omitting one copy
of the row corresponding to zij > z
i
j+1, for all j = 1, . . . Li − 1.
The matrix Bi+1 has strictly fewer rows than Bi. There is therefore n∗ for which
Bn
∗+1 either has no more rows, or Bn
∗+1
1 has only zeroes in all its entries (its rows are
copies of the β-row which has only zeroes in its first K × T columns).
Define a sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′i
t′i
)n
∗
i=1 by letting x
ki
si
= zi1 and x
k′i
t′i
= ziLi . Note that, as
a result, xkisi > x
k′i
t′i
for all i. Therefore the sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′i
t′i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies condition
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(1) in Axiom 1. 
We shall use the sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
)n
∗
i=1 as our candidate violation of Axiom 1.
Consider a sequence of matrices Ai, i = 1, . . . , n∗ defined as follows. Let A1 = A∗,
and
C1 =
[
A1
B1
]
.
Observe that the rows of C1 add to the null vector by Claim 1.
We shall proceed by induction. Suppose that Ai has been defined, and that the rows
of
Ci =
[
Ai
Bi
]
add to the null vector.
Recall the definition of the sequence
xkiti = z
i
1 > . . . > z
i
Li
= x
k′i
t′i
.
There is no z ∈ X with z >i zi1 or ziLi >i z, so in order for the rows of Ci to add to zero
there must be a −1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding to (k′i, t′i) and a 1 in Ai1 in the
column corresponding to (ki, ti). Let ri be a row in A
i corresponding to (ki, ti), and r
′
i be
a row corresponding to (k′i, t
′
i). The existence of a −1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding
to (k′i, t
′
i), and a 1 in A
i
1 in the column corresponding to (ki, ti), ensures that ri and r
′
i
exist. Note that the row r′i is a converted row while ri is original. Let A
i+1 be defined
from Ai by deleting the two rows, ri and r
′
i.
Claim 4. The sum of ri, r
′
i, and the rows of B
i which are deleted when forming Bi+1
(corresponding to the pairs zij > z
i
j+1, j = 1, . . . , Li − 1) add to the null vector.
Proof. Recall that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1, . . . , Li − 1. So when we add the rows corre-
sponding to zij >
i zij+1 and z
i
j+1 >
i zij+2, then the entries in the column for (k, t) with
xkt = z
i
j+1 cancel out and the sum is zero in that entry. Thus, when we add the rows of
Bi that are not in Bi+1 we obtain a vector that is 0 everywhere except the columns cor-
responding to zi1 and z
i
Li
. This vector cancels out with ri+r
′
i, by definition of ri and r
′
i. 
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Claim 5. The matrix A∗ can be partitioned into pairs of rows as follows:
A∗ =

r1
r′1
...
ri
r′i
...
rn∗
r′n∗ ,

in which the rows r′i are converted and the rows ri are original.
Proof. For each i, Ai+1 differs from Ai in that the rows ri and r
′
i are removed from A
i to
form Ai+1. We shall prove that A∗ is composed of the 2n∗ rows ri, r′i.
First note that since the rows of Ci add up to the null vector, and Ai+1 and Bi+1 are
obtained from Ai and Bi by removing a collection of rows that add up to zero, then the
rows of Ci+1 must add up to zero as well.
By way of contradiction, suppose that there exist rows left after removing rn∗ and
r′n∗ . Then, by the argument above, the rows of the matrix C
n∗+1 must add to the null
vector. If there are rows left, then the matrix Cn
∗+1 is well defined.
By definition of the sequence Bi, however, Bn
∗+1 has all its entries equal to zero, or
has no rows. Hence, the rows remaining in An
∗+1
1 must add up to zero. By Claim 2, the
entries of a column (k, t) of A∗ are always of the same sign. Moreover, each row of A∗
has a non-zero element in the first K × S columns. Therefore, no subset of the columns
of A∗1 can sum to the null vector. 
Claim 6. (i) For any k and t, if xkiti = x
k
t for some i, then the row ri corresponding
to (k, t) appears as original in A∗. Similarly, if xk
′
i
t′i
= xkt for some i, then the row
corresponding to (k, t) appears converted in A∗.
(ii) If the row corresponding to (k, t) appears as original in A∗, then there is some i with
xkiti = x
k
t . Similarly, if the row corresponding to (k, t) appears converted in A
∗, then there
is i with x
k′i
t′i
= xkt .
Proof. (i) is true by definition of (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
). (ii) is immediate from Claim 5 because if the
row corresponding to (k, t) appears original in A∗ then it equals ri for some i, and then
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xkt = x
ki
ti . Similarly when the row appears converted. 
Claim 7. The sequence (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies (2) and (3) in Axiom 1.
Proof. We first establish (2). Note that A∗2 is a vector, and in row r the entry of A
∗
2 is
as follows. There must be a (k, t) of which r is a copy. Then the component at row r of
A∗2 is t if r is original and −t if r is converted. Now, when r appears as original there is
some i for which t = ti, when r appears as converted there is some i for which t = t
′
i. So
for each r there is i such that (A∗4)r is either ti or −t′i. By Claim 1 (ii), θ ·A2 + η ·B2 = 0.
Recall that θ · A2 equals the sum of the rows of A∗2. Moreover, B2 is a vector that has
zeroes everywhere except a −1 in the β row (i.e., K × T + 1th row). Therefore, the sum
of the rows of A∗2 equals ηK×T+1, where ηK×T+1 is the K × T + 1th element of η. Since
η ≥ 0, therefore, ∑n∗i=1 ti ≥∑n∗i=1 t′i, and condition (2) in the axiom is satisfied.
Now we turn to (3). By Claim 1 (iii), the rows of A∗3 add up to zero. Therefore, the
number of times that k appears in an original row equals the number of times that it
appears in a converted row. By Claim 6, then, the number of times k appears as ki equals
the number of times it appears as k′i. Therefore condition (3) in the axiom is satisfied.

Finally, in the following, we show that
n∗∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
t′i
> 1,
which finishes the proof of Lemma 5 as the sequence (xkisi , x
k′i
t′i
)n
∗
i=1 would then exhibit a
violation of Axiom 1.
Claim 8.
∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
ti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1.
Proof. By Claim 1 (iv) and the fact that the submatrix E4 equals the scalar 1, we obtain
0 = θ · A4 + piE4 = (
n∗∑
i=1
(ri + r
′
i))4 + pi,
where (
∑n∗
i=1(ri + r
′
i))4 is the (scalar) sum of the entries of A
∗
4. Recall that − log pkiti is
the last entry of row ri and that log p
k′i
t′i
is the last entry of row r′i, as r
′
i is converted and
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ri original. Therefore the sum of the rows of A
∗
4 are
∑n∗
i=1 log(p
k′i
t′i
/pkiti ). Then,
n∗∑
i=1
log(p
k′i
t′i
/pkiti ) = −pi < 0.
Thus
n∗∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′i
t′i
> 1.

4.3.1 Proof of Lemma 6
For each sequence σ = (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
)ni=1 that satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (3) in Axiom 1,
and each pair xkt > x
k′
t′ , define τσ(x
k
t , x
k′
t′ ) to be the number of times the pair (x
k
t , x
k′
t′ )
appears in the sequence σ. Note that τσ is a
KT (KT−1)
2
-dimensional non-negative integer
vector. Define
T =
{
τσ ∈ NKT (KT−1)2 : σ satisfies (1), (2), (3) in Axiom 1
}
.
The set T depends only on (xk)Kk=1 in the data set (x
k, pk)Kk=1.
For each pair xkt > x
k′
t′ , define
δˆ(xkt , x
k′
t′ ) = log
pkt
pk
′
t′
.
Then, δˆ is a KT (KT−1)
2
-dimensional real-valued vector.
If σ = (xkiti , x
k′i
t′i
)ni=1, then
δˆ · τσ =
∑
(xkt ,x
k′
t′ )∈σ
δˆ(xkt , x
k′
t′ )τσ(x
k
t , x
k′
t′ ) = log
( n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′i
t′i
)
.
So the data satisfy Axiom 1 if and only if τ · δˆ ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ T .
Enumerate elements in X in increasing order:
x
k(1)
t(1) < x
k(2)
t(2) < · · · < xk(N)t(N) .
Fix an arbitrary ξ, ξ¯ ∈ (0, 1) with ξ < ξ¯. Due to the denseness of the rational numbers,
and the continuity of the exponential function, there exists a positive number ε(1) such
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that log(p
k(1)
t(1) ε(1)) ∈ Q and ξ < ε(1) < ξ¯; Given ε(1), there exists a positive ε(2) such
that log(p
k(2)
t(2) ε(2)) ∈ Q and ξ < ε(2)/ε(1) < ξ¯. More generally, when ε(n) has been
defined, let ε(n+1) > 0 be such that log(p
k(n+1)
t(n+1) ε(n+1)) ∈ Q and ξ < ε(n+1)/ε(n) < ξ¯.
In this way have defined (ε(n))Nn=1. Let q
k
t = p
k
t ε(n), where n is such that p
k(n)t(n) =
pkt . The claim is that the data (x
k, qk)Kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1. Let δ
∗ be defined from (qk)Kk=1
in the same manner as δˆ was defined from (pk)Kk=1. For each pair x
k
t > x
k′
t′ , if n and m are
such that xkt = x
k(n)
t(n) and x
k′
t′ = x
k(m)
t(m) , then n > m. By definition of ε, ε(n)/ε(m) < ξ¯ < 1.
Hence,
δ∗(xkt , x
k′
t′ ) = log
pkt ε(n)
pk
′
t′ ε(m)
< log
pkt
pk
′
t′
+ log ξ¯ < log
pkt
pk
′
t′
= δˆ(xkt , x
k′
t′ ).
Thus, for all τ ∈ T ,
δ∗ · τ ≤ δˆ · τ ≤ 0,
as τ ≥ 0 and the data (xk, pk)Kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1. Thus the data (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfy
Axiom 1.
Note that ξ < ε(n) for all n. So that by choosing ξ close enough to 1, we can take
the prices (qk) to be as close to (pk) as desired.
4.3.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Consider the system comprised by (3), (4), and (5) in the proof of Lemma 5. Let A,
B, and E be constructed from the data as in the proof of Lemma 5. The difference with
respect to Lemma 5 is that now the entries of A4 may not be rational. Note that the
entries of E, B, and Ai, i = 1, 2, 3 are rational.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system comprised
by (3), (4), and (5). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 5 there is no solution
to System S1. By Lemma 2 with F = R, there is a real vector (θ, η, pi) such that
θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0 and η ≥ 0, pi > 0.
Let (qk)Kk=1 be vectors of prices such that the data set (x
k, qk)Kk=1 satisfies Axiom 1
and log qkt ∈ Q for all k and t. (Such (qk)Kk=1 exists by Lemma 6.) Construct matrices A′,
B′, and E ′ from this data set in the same way as A, B, and E is constructed in the proof
of Lemma 5. Note that only the prices are different in (xk, qk) compared to (xk, pk). So
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E ′ = E, B′ = B and A′i = Ai for i = 1, 2, 3. Since only prices q
k are different in this
dataset, only A′4 may be different from A4.
By Lemma 6, we can choose prices qk such that |θ · A′4 − θ · A4| < pi/2. We have
shown that θ · A4 = −pi, so the choice of prices qk guarantees that θ · A′4 < 0. Let
pi′ = −θ · A′4 > 0.
Note that θ · A′i + η · B′i + pi′Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, as (θ, η, pi) solves system S2 for
matrices A, B and E, and A′i = Ai, B
′
i = Bi and Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. Finally, B4 = 0
so
θ · A′4 + η ·B′4 + pi′E4 = θ · A′4 + pi′ = 0.
We also have that η ≥ 0 and pi′ > 0. Therefore θ, η, and pi′ constitute a solution S2 for
matrices A′, B′, and E ′.
By Lemma 2 we know then that there is no solution to S1 for matrices A′, B′, and
E ′, so there is no solution to the system comprised by (3), (4), and (5) in the proof of
Lemma 5. However, this contradicts Lemma 5 because the data (xk, qk) satisfies Axiom 1
and log qkt ∈ Q for all k = 1, . . . K and s = 1, . . . , S.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
The second statement in the theorem follows from Lemma 1 and the proof of Lemma 4.
We proceed to prove the first statement in the theorem. Assume then that (xk, pk)Kk=1 is
a dataset that satisfies Axiom 1.
Recall that X = {xkt : k = 1, . . . , K, t = 1, . . . , T}. Let ε > 0 be s.t.
ε < min{|x− x′| : x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′}.
Let α(x) = {(k, t) : x = xkt } for x ∈ X .
We shall define a new dataset for which consumptions are not equal, but that still
satisfies Axiom 1. Let (xˆk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset with the same prices as in (x
k, pk)Kk=1; in
which (xˆk)Kk=1 is chosen such that (a) xˆ
k
t 6= xˆk′t′ when (k, t) 6= (k′, t′); and (b) for all x ∈ X
|xˆkt − x| < ε,
for all (k, t) ∈ α(x).
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Observe that, with this definition of data (xˆk, pk)Kk=1, if xˆ
k
t > xˆ
k′
t′ then x
k
t ≥ xk′t′ . The
reason is that, either there is x for which (k, t) ∈ α(x) and (k′, t′) ∈ α(x), in which case
xkt ≥ xk′t′ because x = xkt = xk′t′ ; or there is no x and x′, with x 6= x′, in which (k, t) ∈ α(x)
and (k′, t′) ∈ α(x′), which implies that x > x′ and thus that xkt > xk′t′ .
With this definition of data, if (xˆkisi , xˆ
k′i
t′i
)ni=1 is a sequence of pairs from dataset (xˆ
k, pk)Kk=1
satisfying (1), (2), and (3) in Axiom 1, then (xkisi , x
k′i
t′i
)ni=1 is a sequence of pairs from dataset
(xk, pk)Kk=1 that also satisfies (1), (2), and (3) in Axiom 1. By hypothesis, (x
k, pk)Kk=1 sat-
isfy Axiom 1, so (xˆk, pk)Kk=1 satisfy Axiom 1.
Since (xˆk, pk)Kk=1 satisfies that x
k
t 6= xk′t′ if (k, t) 6= (k′, t′), and Axiom 1, then Lemma 7
implies that there are strictly positive numbers vˆkt , λ
k, βt−1, for t = 1, . . . , T and k =
1, . . . , K, such that
βt−1vˆkt = λ
kpkt
xˆkt > xˆ
k′
t′ ⇒ vˆkt < vˆk
′
t′ .
Define the correspondence v′ : X → R+ by
v′(x) =
[
inf{vˆkt (k, t) ∈ α(x)}, sup{vˆkt (k, t) ∈ α(x)}
]
.
Note that if x > x′ then vˆkt < vˆ
k′
t′ for all (k, t) ∈ α(x) and all (k′, t′) ∈ α(x′). So as a
result of the definition of v′, if x > x′ then sup v′(x) < inf v′(x′).
Let v : R+ → R+ be
v(x) = {inf v′(x˜) : x˜ ∈ X , x˜ ≤ x}
for x ≥ inf X ; and v(x) = {sup v′(x˜) : x˜ ∈ X} for x < inf X . The correspondence v is
monotone. There is therefore a concave function u : R+ → R such that
∂u(x) = v(x)
for all x (See Rockafellar (1997), Theorem 24.8).
In particular, for all x ∈ X and all (k, t) ∈ α(x) we have vˆkt ∈ ∂u(x). Since βt−1vˆkt =
λkpkt , we have
λkpkt
βt−1
∈ ∂u(xkt ).
Hence the first-order conditions for EDU maximization are satisfied at xkt .
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